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Stock Prices of Large Banks
In recent years, we have seen increasing concern
about bank earnings, credit risks, and even bank
failures. Turbulent economic and financial
marketsontheone hand and bankingderegulation
on the other have created what is commonly
thoughtto have been a precarious environment
for banks. Since 1982, escalating numbers of
failures among thrifts, banks,and government
securities dealers seem to have reinforced the
fears ofmany observers.
One way to assess the market's overall evaluation
ofthe developments ofrecent years is to look at
what has happened to the stock prices ofthe insti-
tutions involved. Unfortunately, mostofthe
20,000~()dd banks and thrifts in this country (let
alone credit unions, government securities
dealers, and so forth) do not issue stocks that are
activelytraded in public markets. But, as afirst
pass, we can examine the price behaviorofthe
common stocks ofthe relatively few institutions
whose shares are actively traded on the major
stock exchanges.
The analysis in this Letter is confined to the stock
prices ofseventy-seven large bank holding com-
panies/each with year-end 1981 assets ofover $1
biIIion, forthe period from JuIy 1972 through
March 1985. The evidence presented does not
necessarily pertain to small banks, thrifts, orother
institutions that normally have portfolios, opera-
tions, and markets differentfromthoseofthe large
bank holding companies.
The environment
Manyevents since the late 1970s have lefttheir
impacts on banks. Since 1979, the U.S. economic
environment has been characterized by a boom
and bust in thedomesticenergy-producingsector,
two economic recessions, prolonged unemploy-
ment with lasting differential impacts across
sectors and geographic areas, and rising inflation
followed by disinflation. U.S. interest rates have
remained high, especially relative to the deceler-
ating inflation rate, while the real (inflation-
adjusted) trade-weighted value ofthe UoS. dollar
has risen fifty percentsince 1980. Disinflation and
high interestrates have had adepressingeffectnot
only on domestic markets such as real estate but,
in tandem with the strong dollar, have had espe-
cially deleterious impacts on U.S. industries that
compete in world markets, such as agriculture,
mining, timber, and many manufactured goods.
Banks, like manyother players in the markets,
were surprised bythe economic events ofthe
1980s. Many large banks found themselves
saddled with the debts of lesser developed
countries (LDCs) ata time when worldwide dis-
inflation, high interest rates, and a strong u.s.
dollar boosted these borrowers' debt burdens..
Lowearnings and high debtservicing costsofU.s.
companies in troubled industries also resulted in
increased problem loans and defaults. Moreover,
some banks and mostsavings and loans held large
positions in fixed-rate mortgages and found their
net worth positions suffering under high interest
rates. Default rates on real estate loans also in~
creased in some areas ofthe country.
Atatime when the economic and financial
environment was full ofsurprises, deregulation of
u.s. banking proceeded at a rapid pace. Begin-
ningwith the money market certificate (MMC) in
1978 and proceeding through the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Actof1980 and the Garn-St Germain Depository
Institutions Actof1982, deposit rate ceilings were
all buteliminated for banks and thrifts. The new
environment increased the scope for both price
and productcompetition in banking markets.
Removal ofdeposit rate ceilings was the major
factor, butother changes wereimportant as well.
For example, thrifts were given widely increased
powerstocompetedirectlywith banks byoffering
checkingaccounts, expanding intoconsumerand
commercial lending, and broadening their hold-
ing company activities.
It is clear that the period since 1979 brought sur-
prises and rapid changeto U.s. banking. In viewof
the complexityofthe developments, itwould be
virtually impossible to separate outthe effectof
each factor. In the evidence that follows, the
behavior ofstock prices portrays the neteffectof
the combination offactors. Contrary to whatone
mightsurmise, the stockpricesoflargebankhold-
ing companies have fared well on average sinceFRBSF
1979. However, loans to domestic energy firms
had severe repercussions for some ofthe institu-
tions and lendingtoLatin American LDCs also had
adecidedlynegative impactonmanyofthe larger
holdingcompanies. A few large banks heavily
involved in domesticenergy lendinghaveactually
failed orbeen required to reorganize.
Evidence for large banks
The chart depicts indices ofstock prices for the
Standard and Poors (S&P) 500 and fortwogroups
oflarge bank holding companies (hereafter
"banks")-twenty-twowith assets over $10
biIIion at year-end 1981 and fifty-fivewith assets of
$1-10 billion. For the full span ofover 12 years,
the stock prices of large banks generally kept up
with the S&P 500, although there w~re some
periodsofnotableexception. The indices forbank
stocks and the S&P 500 showed significant
declines in value during 1974. Moreover, the
$1-10 billion banks-often referred to as
"regional" banks-suffered considerably larger
stock price declines in 1974 and took longerto
recoverthan did the $10+ billion banks, manyof
which are "money center" banks.
Lookingatthe earlypost-1979 period, say through
1982, it is evidentthat stock prices oflarge banks
were very volatile-first rising into 1981, then
decliningthrough mid-1982 but reaching new
highs by early 1983. Especially forthe $1-10 bil-
lion group, the gains from their lows ofearly 1980
were particularly striking.
The post-1979 period as a whole has been ex-
tremely favorable to the stock prices ofthe $1-10
billion banks. Their compound annual rate ofre-
turn (excluding dividends) has been over 22
percent, a figure thatexceeds the returns ofthe
$10+ billion banks and the S&P 500 by awide
margin. The continued strong stock returns within
the $1-10 billion group since early 1983 suggest
that the deregulation ofconsumer deposits at that
time (particularly the money market deposit
account, orMMDA, introduced in December
1982) may have been instrumental in raising the
market's assessments ofthose banks.
When the MMDAwas first introduced, regional
banks that did nothave access to the prime
national CD market maintained that the new ac-
countwould lowertheir marginal cost offunds.
Manyofthese banks normally had paid well
above the national rates for large CDs, holding
companycommercial paper, and otherwholesale
funds. The consumer-oriented MMDApromised
to attract funds at a substantially lower rate. In
contrast, the $10+ billion money center banks
would be helped bythe MMDA, but not as much
as the regional banks would be since the money
center banks already had access to wholesale
funds at favorable rates.
Especially sinceearly1983,thepriceperformance
ofthe group of $10+ billion banks has differed
widely from that ofthe $1-10 billion group. From
Apri11983 toMarch 1985,the average stock price
inthegroupof$lO+ billion banks did notchange
much, while the average stock price in the $1-10
billion group rose by 41 percent.
The lackluster stock performanceofthe $10+ bil-
lion banks well after early 1983 at the same time
that the other group had excellent stock per-
formance suggests thatthere weresome important
factors distinguishingthe two groups besides the
differential effect ofderegulation. One possible
factor is that LDC loan exposures ofthe largest
banks may have affected their stock prices ad-
versely. Such loan exposures are concentrated
predominantly within the groupof $10+ billion
banks.
Statistical analysis performed across individual
banks within the $10+ billion group indicatesthat
LDC debt exposures had a large negative impact.
However, banks with the worst stock price per-
formance also were laden with problem loans in
the domestic energy-producing sector. Afterthe
individual $10+ billion banks with massive
energy-loan losses were removed from the $10+
billion bank group, statistical analysis applied
across the remaining 20 banks in the group sug-
gests that loan exposures to the Latin American
countries ofArgentina, Brazil, Mexico, and
Venezuela explain the wide discrepancy in the
stock price performances ofthe two bank groups.
(See this Bank's Economic Review, Winter 1985,
for a detailed analysis.)
It is not surprising that both energy loans and LDC
debtwere importantfactors, and thatenergy loans
seemed to be the predominantfactor affecting a
few ofthe largest banks thatwere majorenergy
lenders. Energy loans resulted in a rash ofactual
defaults and chargeoffs which were confined to
relatively few banks. Indeed, two $10+ billion
banks (Seafirst and Continental Illinois, neitherofwhich is included in the index oftwenty-two
$10+ billion banks) had to be taken over or re-
formed primarilybecauseofdomesticenergy loan
losses. In contrast, theforeign lendingproblem up
to this point has resulted primarily in reschedul-
ings and fears ofdefault. Moreover, since the
foreign loan problem affects almost all large
banks, the market mightexpect more government
intervention in the event ofa crisis than with the
energy loan problem.
Conclusion
In conclusion, an analysis ofthe stock price per-
formance ofbanks with assets over $1 billion,
suggests that, at least until 1983, the post-1979
economic and deregulatory environmentwas not
unfavorable on average to these banks and was
favorable overall to the regional bank holding
companies with assets ranging from $1 billion to
$10 billion. However, since early 1983 there has
been no gain in the valuation, on average, of
equitiesofthevery largebankholdingcompanies,
those with assets over $10 billion. The poor per-
formance ofthe $10+ billion bank holdingcom-
panies relative to the $1-10 billion bank holding
companies seemingly can be explained by the
relative impactofconsumer deposit deregulation,
domestic energy loan losses at a few ofthe banks,
and LatinAmerican debtexposures across abroad
array ofthe largest banks.
A few caveats regardingthe analysisofbankstock
prices need to be brought out. First, the stock
analysis of large bank holding companies should
notbe extrapolatedtosmall banks, thrifts,orother
financial institutions. Second, it is plausible that
the public has cometoexpectgreatergovernment
protection ofbanking and this expectation has
helped to raise the stock prices ofbank holding
companies, particularly large ones, since 1979.
Certainlythe increase in the deposit insurance
limitfrom $40,000 to $100,000 in March of1980
had a favorable impacton banks and thrifts.
But changes in other forms ofgovernment protec-
tion are notas easy to pinpoint. Forexample, until
1984,the FDIC claimedthat inthecase offailureit
would adhere onlyto a partial payout on deposits
over $100,000. But in the case ofContinental
Illinois, Maythrough aboutJuly of1984, itpro-
tected all deposit and even nondeposit liabilities.
Subsequently, FDIC officials have talked publicly
ofreverting to partial payouts. These governme(.1tal
policy changes have affected bank stock prices in
complex ways and theireffects are compounded
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*Month-end closing price levels calculated from returns, excluding dividends.
The bank stock indices are based on equally weighted average returns forthe
population of all 22 bank holdingcompanies in the $10+ billion size group,
excluding Seafirst and Continental Illinois, and asample of55 bank holding
companies in the $1-10 billion size group. Had Seafirst and Continental Illinois
been included in the $10+ billion index, the level ofthat index in 1985 would
have been slightly lower.
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Selected Assets and Liabilities
Large Commercial Banks
BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)
Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 191,817 - 62 10,210 5.6
Loans and Leases1 6 173,401 - 364 10,830 6.6
Commercial and Industrial 51,822 - 227 1,546 3.0
Real estate 63,422 103 2,882 4.7
Loans to Individuals 34,542 127 6,161 21.7
Leases 5,380 7 391 7.8
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,459 278 - 474 - 3.9
OtherSecurities2 6,956 23 - 145 - 2.0
Total Deposits 195,154 -1,907 8,395 4.4
Demand Deposits 45,309 -1,441 1,823 4.1
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,700 - 862 1,240 4.3
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,134 - 436 1,306 11.0
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,710 - 31 5,264 4.0
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 44,218 - 11 5,737 14.9
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 38,399 16 - 1,726 - 4.3

















1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change